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EPILOGUE: WELLENKAMP v. BANK OF
AMERICA
ROBERT KRATOVIL*

In 1979 this author's article on the due-on-sale clause was
published.' The article was sharply critical of Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America.2 This decision involved an attempt by a
lender to accelerate a mortgage containing a due-on-sale clause
when the parties, upon a sale subject to the mortgage, declined
to agree to an increase in the interest rate. The buyer brought
an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the
lender. The California Supreme Court held that the lender
could only exercise the clause upon a showing that it was necessary to protect the lender against an impairment of the lender's
security.3 This thinking was superimposed upon a clause devoid
of any such limitation. The decision could have been written
without leaving the confines of a modest law library, since it approached the problem by dealing with the venerable doctrine of
restraints on alienation. 4 The world outside, the grim world
where thrift institutions, the big users of the due-on-sale clause,
were and are threatened with calamitous insolvencies, was al• Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; J.D. DePaul University. Professor Kratovil has also authored numerous legal articles as
well as several textbooks in the area of real property and mortgage law.
1. Kratovil, A New Dilemmafor Thrift Institutions: JudicialEmasculation of the Due-on-Sale Clause, 12 J. Mar. J. Prac. &Proc. 299 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Due-on-SaleI. A question frequently arises concerning the
validity in the mortgage of a due-on-sale clause permitting the mortgagee to
declare an acceleration of the mortgage debt in the event of a sale of the
property by the mortgagor where the buyer does not pay off the old mortgage. The mortgagee's ability to accelerate forces a purchaser either to
agree to a higher interest rate or seek alternate financing.
2. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
3. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86. In the usual
case, the seller is able to obtain full payment and pay off the mortgage because the buyer has secured independent mortgage financing. In Wellenkamp, however, tight money precluded new financing. The buyer
wanted to pay the seller only the amount of the seller's equity and assume
the remaining debt. See generally Due-on-Sale, supra note 1, at 306-11.
The reasons that lenders hesitate to lend unless the due-on-sale clause
can been enforced is at least two-fold: substitution of a mortgagor who is
not a good financial risk; and the thrift institution's interest in improving
their yield by upgrading loan portfolios. It could be argued that the interest
rate on the initial loan would be higher if lenders knew they could not enforce the due-on-sale clause upon a subsequent sale.
4. Id. at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973-74, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
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most entirely ignored. The author's article made this point:
"Surely sound public policy must take account of the need for
the continued existence of financial'5 institutions willing and able
to finance the purchase of homes."
Since Wellenkamp was decided, much has happened. A
number of new alternative mortgage instruments have made
their appearance, among them the: Adjustable Rate Mortgage; 6
Shared Appreciation Mortgage; 7 Graduated Payment Adjustable Mortgage; 8 and, Price Level Adjusted Mortgage. 9 The terse
conjecture in Wellenkamp that the old Variable Rate Mortgage
(VRM) 10 contained a solution to the lender's portfolio"
problems appears, therefore, to have been wide of the mark.
An American Law Reports annotation addressing the dueon-sale controversy has appeared 12 as well as a collection of all
authorities on this subject in the Legal Bulletin.13 Of particular
concern is the problem of federal preemption. The focal point of
the controversy is whether Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) regulations protecting due-on-sale clauses in mortgages by federal savings and loan associations' 4 may be overridden by state laws forbidding such clauses. As is evident from
the Legal Bulletin articles and case references, all the numerous
5. Due-on-Sale, supra note 1, at 309.
6. The Adjustable Rate Mortgage is similar to the present fixed mortgage except that the interest rate varies (either without limit or limited to
plus or minus two percentage points) per adjustment period. See Invitation: FHLMC Adjustable Rate Mortgage Pilot Purchase Program (July 1,
1981).
7. The Shared Appreciation Mortgage allows the lender to share in the
appreciation of the property when sold. In return the lender makes a fixed
interest loan at a lower than market rate. See generally Comment, The

Shared Appreciation Mortgage: A Clog on the Equity of Redemption, 15 J.
MAR.L. REV. 175 (1982).

8. A fixed interest rate mortgage with a modified payment schedule,
where the monthly payments start low and increase over the years, presumably with the increased income of the borrower. See R. KRATOVIL &R.
WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAw AND PRACTICE

463-68 (2d ed. 1981).

9. Fixed interest rate but the outstanding principal varies with some
price index. Id. at 472.
10. The VRM is similar to the present fixed mortgage except that the
interest rate varies within limits per adjustment period to reflect changes in
the market rate of interest. One of the main weaknesses of the VRM was
that the lender also had to offer the borrower the option of a fixed rate mortgage. Id. at 456-60.
11. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.10, 582 P.2d at 976
n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.10.
12. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d 713 (1976) (this will enable practititioners to
keep up with the decisional law).
13. XLVII LEGAL BuLL. 275, 278 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL
BULL.] (published by the U.S. League of Savings Associations).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f), (g) (1979). The FHLBB has had these regulations in effect since 1976.
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federal decisions sustain federal preemption. 15 While some
state courts have upheld the validity of the due-on-sale clause, 16
17
other state courts have chosen to follow Wellenkamp,' many
going so far as to adopt statutes that in one way or another fetter
the operation of the due-on-sale clause.' 8 Recently, the United
States Supreme Court agreed to hear a case which may settle
the issue of federal preemption concerning federally chartered
savings and loan associations.' 9
In the meantime, the thrift industry continues to wallow in a
financial morass. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) admits that the closings of insolvent savings and loan
associations will continue. Many are running in the red; some
weak or insolvent associations have been merged into stronger
20
associations. Fears of continued financial trouble continue.
A report was prepared for the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) on the subject. 21 The article reflects
15. See First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n of Gadsden County v. Peterson,
516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Collins v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n of
Walla Walla, No. C-80-334 (E.D. Wash. May 14, 1981); Nalore v. San Diego
Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, Cir. No. 77-0660-N (N.D. Cal. 1979); Bailey v. First
Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n of Ottawa, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979), as
examples of federal cases recognizing federal preemption of due-on-sales
clauses. For a more complete listing of federal decisions upholding, and
state decisions upholding and rejecting federal preemption see LEGAL
BuLL., supra note 13, at 275-86 (1981).
16. Id. at 278. For example, decisions in Alabama, Louisiana, Illinois,
New Jersey and New York have upheld due-on-sale clauses.
17. See, e.g., Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz.
473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 121 Cal.
App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), prob. juris noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3490
(U.S. Jan. 25, 1982) (No. 81-750) (likely to address the federal preemption
question concerningfederal associations); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 73 Mich. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); First Fed. Say. & Loan of Engelewood v. Lockwood, 385 So.2d 156 (Fla. D.C.A. 1980). But see First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n of Gadsden County v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D.
Fla. 1981) (recognizing validity of due-on-sale clause and federal preemption). See also LEGAL BULL., supra note 15, at 279.
18. See CAL. Crvn. CODE §§ 711, 2924.6 (West 1979); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-30-165 (1978); GA. CODE § 67-3002 (1981 Supp.); IOWA CODE § 535.8 (West
Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-12 (1981 Supp.). See also Newsletter by
United States Savings & Loan Associations (Jan. 14, 1982) (citing state statutes, and state and federal cases pertaining to due-on-sale clauses).
19. Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d
328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), prob. juris. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1982) (No. 81-750). Regardless of how Fidelity is decided with respect to
preemption over federally chartered savings and loan associations, Congress would not be precluded, subsequently, from enacting legislation preempting state law. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text, and infra
note 23 and accompanying text.
20. Hill & Gigot, Federal Regulators Are Said to Sanction Mergers
Among Ailing Savings and Loans, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
21. B. Preiss and R. Van Order, An Economic Analysis of Due-on-Sale
Clauses (1981) (prepared by the Office of Pol'y Dev. and Research, U.S.
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the importance of the due-on-sale clause, concluding that fettering of the due-on-sale clause "would have a significant adverse
'22
effect on savings and loan earnings and ultimately net worth.
In addition, a bill was recently introduced in Congress that
would permit federally chartered thrift institutions to enforce
the due-on-sale clause. 23 Speaking to this bill, Paul A. Volcker,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
made this comment to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, October 29, 1981:
Section 141 would permit depository institutions, state law
notwithstanding, to enforce due-on-sale clauses in mortgage instruments. For the majority of Board members, the reluctance to preempt state law is in this instance more than offset by a sense of
urgency growing out of the strongly adverse effects on the soundness of thrift institutions of failure to enforce due-on-sale clauses.
Inability to enforce contractual due-on-sale provisions, agreed to by
the borrower in undertaking the mortgage commitment, has slowed
the turnover of low-yielding mortgages in institutional portfolios
precisely at the time when earnings pressures are so strong as to
threaten the viability of many thrift institutions. Indeed, the net
result of failure to enforce due-on-sale clauses may be to restrain
the provision of new fixed-rate mortgages
more than would other24
wise be the case in today's markets.
One could not possibly learn from Wellenkamp that its holding would "threaten the viability of many thrift institutions." It
is regrettable that in this day and age, when we are encouraging
our-law students to analyze court decisions in the light of their
financial and economic setting and impact, a major court could
hand down a decision so totally lacking in insight. The present
activity in the legislative and judicial spheres are encouraging
indicators that common sense public policy may eventually
prevail.

Dept. of Housing and Urb. Dev.). The authors conclude that "there is no
compelling reason to... prohibit due-on-sale clauses." Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 18.
23. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 141, 127 CONG. REC. 11,257 (1981). In
addition to the bill's limitation to federal associations, it also provides the
states with an opt-out provisions through state law or voter referendum. Id.
24. 67 FED. REs. BuLL. 840 (1981).

